Cornell Researchers Take On Cybersecurity for GPS Systems

From cars to commercial airplanes to military drones, global positioning system technology is everywhere, and researchers have known for years that it can be hacked or “spoofed.”

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From cars to commercial airplanes to military drones, global positioning system technology is everywhere, and researchers have known for years that it can be hacked or “spoofed.”

Now, the best defense, Cornell University researchers say, is a good offense — by detecting false signals and creating countermeasures that unscrupulous GPS spoofers can’t deceive.

Researchers led by Mark Psiaki, professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering, got to test their latest protections against GPS spoofing during a Department of Homeland Security-sponsored demonstration last month in the New Mexico desert at the White Sands Missile Range.

GPS是一种导航和时序系统,它使用卫星在地球上盘旋以传输信号并提供有关接收器位置的精确信息。欺骗是传输接收器接受的假GPS信号,使黑客允许控制依赖GPS技术的平面,车辆或其他设备。

During a much-publicized June 19 demo of a mini helicopter’s GPS signal being spoofed by using live “on-air” transmissions to confuse real GPS signals, Cornell researchers Psiaki, senior engineer Steve Powell and graduate students Brady O’Hanlon and Ryan Mitch tested a receiver modification that can differentiate spoofed GPS signals from real ones. Psiaki said their latest countermeasure allowed the Cornell group to correctly detect spoofing in three cases during the demo.

“This is strong confirmation that our system can successfully detect spoofing in an autonomous mode using short segments of GPS receiver data. It is the first known detection of this type of attack from a live, on-air spoofer,” Psiaki said.

“The idea is not just for us to make spoofers so we can show bad things can happen, but also to gain insight into countermeasures in typical GPS receivers so they can be less vulnerable to attack,” Powell said.

In addition to its role in commercial and military aircraft navigation, GPS signals also help control the nation’s power grid, as well as cell phone towers and even automated stock trades.

研究人员还警告称,全球定位系统(GPS)欺骗growing threat. Last year, Iran claimed to have spoofed – and downed – a GPS-guided American drone. Such an attack, Psiaki said, might have been carried out using techniques similar to those demonstrated at White Sands if the drone had been using civilian GPS signals.

Cornell University Research -http://www.cornell.edu/research/

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